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IMMIGRANTS & MINORITIES

Deportation at all costs? Adapting US migration policies to the First World War

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ABSTRACT

The 1917 US Immigration Law marks a significant turning point in migration governance as a whole. More specifically regarding deportation, it shifted from a means of border control to become a post-entry tool of social oversight. Scholars stress that this transition was not sudden and developed gradually during the pre-war decades, yet they overlook how deportation was carried out during the war years immediately preceding the reform. This article discusses how the First World War disrupted deportations to Europe, the pressures this set on migration governance and the solutions the immigration authorities came up with. Apart from legal and humanitarian aspects, the article draws attention to the logistical and financial considerations shaping formal deportation policies and how these were put into practice. It does so from the perspective of an important but much neglected go-between in migration governance: the transatlantic shipping companies. Before 1917 they carried most of the legal, logistical and financial responsibility for executing deportations. In the article I argue that under the new law, shipping companies continued to function as an essential actor in immigration enforcement. Yet, by granting more leeway to the immigration authorities to carry out deportations independently, the law marked a crucial turning point in reducing the responsibility of transport companies for migration governance.

KEYWORDS

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shipping company

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transportation

On 6 August 1914, just days after Europe had plunged into total warfare, the *New York Times* featured the following headline: 'Deportable aliens cost city \$1,000,000'. The article reported on a meeting of city officials, heads of charity and the federal immigration commissioner to discuss the burden placed by the approximately 6,000 deportable aliens on the annual budget of local charities and hospitals. In the past, these costs had been covered by an appropriation of the federal Immigrant Fund. Yet, for 1914, no budget had been granted. During the meeting, all parties came to a consensus, but a much bigger problem was looming in the background. Transatlantic steamers started discontinuing their sailings when

Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August. Transport disruptions completely undermined deportations. For instance, deportees who had been transferred to the Cunard Line's *Saxonia* were returned because their sailing was cancelled. Another issue was where to deport from. Anticipating more problems to carry out deportations, the Superintendent of the Matteawan State Hospital stopped accepting criminal aliens. Already overcrowded, the hospital did not want to get stuck with expensive deportees whom no one wanted to pay for. Only four days earlier, the *New York Times* had applauded the deportation of eight lunatics from Matteawan Hospital, saving the state \$25,000. The figure was based on an annual rate of \$235 and an average stay of twelve years.¹

These newspaper articles highlight that practical and financial repercussions were much more important than legal or humanitarian considerations. The *New York Times* immediately put its finger on the biggest problem that US immigration authorities faced during the conflict: what to do with rejected newcomers at the gates and immigrants who were expelled from US territory in wartime? Could they be sent back across the high seas to war zones? If so, under what conditions? And if not, what were the alternatives? Aside from the legal aspects, what practical, humanitarian and financial issues were at stake here? Could disruptions to deportation derail migration policies as a whole?

During the second half of the nineteenth century, nation states had turned migration policies into a symbol of national sovereignty. Unilateral decisions that regulated immigration were commonly accepted, granting receiving countries the right to deny the entry or stay of foreigners, and hence also to deport them.² The legal basis for these deportations was mostly established before 1914, but cross-border negotiations were needed to enforce them, creating an international regime of deportation.³ Indeed, a nation's deportation policy took shape within networks of global communication supported by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors with different views on deportation. Its enforcement was defined by practical considerations such as physical infrastructure, bureaucratic capacity and, not least, the available budget. However, scholars have rarely integrated these factors in their analysis.⁴

In the US, the first federal immigration reforms of 1882 and 1891 centred on keeping undesirables out and only adopted deportation as a form of extended border control. This meant that migrants who entered legally could only be removed from the territory based on conditions that were already in place before arriving, but which manifested themselves afterwards. This mainly included certain diseases, disabilities and other conditions that might have a bearing on the public purse. However, anarchists, polygamists or prostitutes could also be expelled on these grounds. Initially, this only applied to the first year after arrival, but the reforms extended the period to three years in 1907 and, for prostitutes, indefinitely in 1910. Generally speaking, this still meant that people who had entered legally could not be expelled because of their conduct on American soil. Deportations on grounds of misconduct after legal entry can be seen as a form of post-entry social control, and as a regular phenomenon would only fully break through after the legal reforms of 1917.⁵ The extended pre-war judicial process that was necessary to get to this point has been discussed at length, as have the long-

term repercussions for migration policies and the central position of deportation up to this day. The deportation system grew slowly, incrementally and reactively, and is therefore best understood through a long historical frame.⁶

However, the existing scholarly overviews pay very little attention to what actually happened during the war and to what extent these events may have catalysed the transition. This has led to many misconceptions about migration during the First World War, not least the false assumption that transatlantic migration stopped completely for 'a war-induced break from 1914–1918'.⁷ For a long time, 1914 was understood to have marked the end of the liberal mass migration era and the beginning of a passport regime restricting free movement. This has focused the attention of most migration scholars by neatly dividing migration history into two distinct research areas: one ending in 1914, and one starting in 1918. The years between 1914 and 1918 were perceived as a no man's land for migration historians.⁸ However, over the past two decades, some scholars, including Adam McKeown, have expanded the narrow Atlantic view by highlighting other migration movements that carried on well into the 1920s. They have shown that the restrictive passport regime of the 1920s was the result of long-term trends in regulations, border controls and nationalism that existed well before 1914.⁹

The fact that still half a million European migrants passed through Ellis Island during the First World War shows that even transatlantic flows never fully stopped. Vincent Cannato's analysis of the immigrant inspection station during the First World War highlights the humanitarian regime conducted by Commissioner Howe.¹⁰ Nonetheless, rejection rates surged from below two per cent to five per cent. The number of migrants arriving from Europe fell while controls were not relaxed, even for Belgians, who were the object of an unprecedented US-led humanitarian campaign. Approximately 25,000 European migrants were rejected on arrival during the war.¹¹ Cannato suggests that none were shipped back. Deportations to Europe were halted altogether, without distinction based on nationality or between people already in the country and new arrivals. Deportation orders were still issued but were postponed until after the war was over.¹² Deirdre Moloney's seminal work on deportations sheds little light on the matter. However, her research did uncover how the enforcement of deportation applied to individuals and differed according to gender and race, highlighting the vulnerability of women and non-whites. She pointed out that this marginalisation easily extended to any migrant and non-citizen in crisis situations, especially during the Red Scare (1917–20) and McCarthy (1950–4) eras. Scaling back these regimes when normality returned proved far more difficult than introducing them. Moloney emphasises the role of immigrant advocate organisations as mediators between migrants and government agencies. Surprisingly, her thematic chapters do not discuss any deportation cases during the First World War, nor how this crisis connected the pre- and interwar periods.¹³

By uncovering how the war affected deportation practices, this article aims to draw more attention to the continuity between the pre- and interwar eras. It does so from the perspective of another important but much neglected go-between in migration governance: the transatlantic shipping companies. As a notable exception, William Walters has indicated the

importance of transport networks in contemporary migration studies by coining the concept of 'viapolitics' as a way 'to theorize the place of journeys and transport systems within the studies of the governance of migration and mobility'. He contends that transport vehicles, companies, and hubs greatly affect the power relations governing human mobility, and play a pivotal role in their enforcement.¹⁴ Yet what are the historical roots of viapolitics? Analysing the integration of railways in the US deportation mechanisms, Ethan Blue states that changes in deportation infrastructure determined the legal and material practices of defining, regulating and controlling migrants.¹⁵ However Blue's analysis begins with the first steps in 1914, nearly a century after transatlantic shipping companies started becoming an integrated part of US federal migration policies. A recent article discusses how shipping companies were used to halt unauthorised European immigration and return undesirables before the First World War. It highlights the introduction of carrier sanctions and financial penalties designed to impose immigration controls upon the transport companies themselves. The aim was, of course to pass responsibility for enforcing federal migration laws onto the shipping lines. An essential part of this policy consisted in transferring the deportation costs of rejected migrants at American ports and expelled migrants from US territory to the shipping line that brought them in. Aside from indicating the deep historical roots of these practices, research has shown that it was more structurally integrated in the legal framework and enforcement practices than is the case today.¹⁶

Transferring deportation costs to shipping companies was part of the US authorities' remote border control strategy, a policy designed to screen migrants far away from the receiving country's national borders. By inflating these costs, authorities wanted to encourage shipping lines to avoid deportations in the first place. This pushed these shipping lines to invest in human resources and infrastructure to prevent ineligible passengers from leaving Europe. The strategy proved effective for certain categories of would-be transatlantic migrant, mostly people ineligible for medical reasons. Yet, other categories, such as prostitutes and pimps, were much more difficult to detect.¹⁷ For officials at Ellis Island as well, such undesirables were hard to uncover. Evidence often only surfaced post-entry. For these categories, deportation developed into an extended border control after arrival. Labelling prostitution as a pre-arrival condition allowed authorities to bill the costs of removal to shipping companies. Migration authorities kept good records of immigrants' travel route via passenger manifests and their documents often refer to the incoming itinerary due to their importance in organising eventual deportation in similar fashion. Yet, for deportations carried out on the basis of post-entry social control and on grounds of misconduct independent of preconditions before arrival, legal grounds to transfer costs to the shipping companies were harder to find. However, not transferring these expenses would mean deviating from one of the central principles of US migration policy, and implied accepting major financial responsibilities. The outbreak of the war brought the question of the financial responsibility for deportees as a major issue to the fore, even more so after the US entered the war and turned enemy aliens and the Red Scare into threats large enough to overcome concerns about

the cost of organising expulsions. To better grasp this pivotal change in US migration policies, we need a detailed analysis of how the war actually affected transatlantic deportations.

The main source for this article will be the correspondence of the New York head-agent of the Holland American Line (HAL) with the board of directors in Rotterdam. All issues regarding transatlantic travel were discussed in this correspondence. Since 1873, the prime service of the company had been its passenger line between Rotterdam and New York. As a well-established passenger company and member of shipping cartels, the Dutch line remained neutral and operative throughout most of the war. Its business archives give us unique insights into how the shipping line continued its passenger service, including deportations. As Michael Miller has observed, the war rearranged rather than dismantled shipping connections and global interconnectedness. In other words, it highlighted the significance of world trade and extended it.¹⁸ Shipping records are complemented with files of the US immigration authorities and newspaper articles. The article first looks at how the war obstructed transatlantic mobility as a whole. The repatriation of stranded Americans in Europe illustrates the immediate obstacles travellers faced, how these were overcome, and to what extent the transatlantic shipping companies remained operative. This logistical setting was crucial for discontinuing deportations to Europe and resuming them once transport networks adapted to the new situation. The second part of the article discusses how the US authorities dealt with deportees from the end of 1914 to America's entry into the war in 1917. It assesses how the extended border control principle and the reliance on shipping companies persisted. The third part looks at how the wartime situation affected the clauses regarding deportation in the 1917 Immigration Law. It reflects on how the law was rooted in previous reforms and continued to rely on shipping lines, and at the same time how it set the legal stage for immigration authorities to become less dependent on them by spurring deportations as a post-entry social control system fully financed by US authorities. Carrying out deportations in spite of these new costs highlights the centrality of deportation within US migration policies as a whole.

Discontinuing deportations

How disruptive was the outbreak of the war for transatlantic mobility in general and deportations in particular? At first, it greatly affected transatlantic mobility as illustrated by recent research on how approximately 150,000 stranded Americans in Europe struggled to return. Using the same ships and inland transit routes as migrants, they exemplify the barriers transatlantic passengers faced as a whole.¹⁹ The declarations of war came at the peak of the transatlantic tourist season. Furthermore, this was no longer a high-society phenomenon, but had also started to include the middle class, such as schoolteachers for example. A return to the old country was also more and more within the reach of established migrants, some of whom had become naturalised Americans and others not. The outbreak of war turned leisure and family trips into very challenging journeys, with four main obstacles. The first was the run on banks that made it very difficult to obtain cash to pay for lodging, food and transport. Secondly, a spy-mania took hold of belligerent countries, turning foreigners into suspects.

Proving one's American nationality was crucial to avoid arrest, let alone to move to ports of embarkation, as roadblocks appeared everywhere. Although passport obligations had long been abolished in Europe, tourists still needed identity papers. Even so, they often preferred to keep their documents somewhere safe rather than carrying them around. This explains why some encountered difficulties in proving their identity, especially as countries reintroduced passport requirements to closely monitor mobility. Thirdly, securing means to reach ports of embarkation proved very difficult, since the whole transport system was mobilised to serve the war effort. Once there, securing a berth on board of ships proved a fourth and final main hurdle.²⁰

Zooming in on this fourth obstacle, we can see that the well-organised transatlantic passenger business was at first destabilised, but quickly adapted to the new reality. The number of transatlantic departures was drastically cut; all shipping companies of the Central Powers were forced to suspend their activities, since the Allied Powers dominated the seas. The withdrawal of the German shipping giants North German Lloyd (NGL) and Hamburg America Line put a serious dent into the transatlantic passenger capacity. The British and French passenger companies were able to continue their services, but only in part because several of their ships were requisitioned for military purposes. The Russian American Line suspended its service, because the access to its homeport was blocked. The Belgian-American Red Star Line faced the same problem but moved part of its operations from Antwerp to British ports. The neutral lines (the Holland America Line, the American Line, the Danish DFDS and the Norwegian America Line) formed the safest bet to return via northern European ports. They adhered closely to their pre-war sailing schedule yet could not meet the overwhelming demand. Others tried their luck via Mediterranean ports. Various smaller Italian shipping companies offered an important alternative. Yet, served by second-rate steamers, this longer and less popular route failed to fill to capacity despite the surge in demand.²¹

The shipping lines collaborated via multi-layered cartel agreements regulating routes, ocean fares, advertisements, migrant agents, inland railroad prices to ports, market shares, and so on. Although disrupted, these agreements were upheld during the first stage of the war. The business of these shipping companies expanded far beyond ocean travel, also encompassing inland voyages, banking services, accommodation, legal and medical care, and so on. To sell their services, they relied on a wide transatlantic network of migration agents working on commission. Especially on the European side, this network quickly disintegrated, mainly due to the agents' military duties. Nonetheless, believing that the war was going to be short-lived, the companies tried to maintain the existing structures as much as possible so that they could go back to normal business as soon as peace returned.²²

As the war continued, shipping lines quickly adapted to war conditions. They tried to attract whatever business still presented itself, including stranded Americans. The US government immediately passed appropriation bills to facilitate their return. Armed cruisers with gold arrived by the end of August to alleviate the liquidity problems. In the meantime, diplomats and entrepreneurs, with Herbert Hoover leading the way, set up local American citizens relief

committees to assist in primary needs and direct people to ports. Authorities, working in concert with shipping magnates, explored the possibility of chartering ships to arrange the overseas transport themselves. However, this posed many logistical challenges and was very costly. Relying on the expertise of the shipping lines that remained operative and which pledged to get their passengers back proved much more efficient. Although legally tickets contained a clause voiding the responsibility of the carrier to provide passage in the event of a war, in practice the companies went to great lengths to accommodate stranded travellers without extra charge. By the end of August, special trains were arranged for stranded passengers along the same transport corridors that millions of migrants had used before to reach ports. By mid-October 1914, the US had managed to get everyone back.²³

This showed that, logistically, transatlantic crossings remained operative. If Americans could safely be brought back, then why not use the same routes to expel undesirables in the opposite direction? Initially, the uncertainty of war forced the immigration authorities to suspend deportations. As State Secretary William Bryan specified: 'if there is any reason to believe that they (deportees) would be subject to war dangers either at high seas or after arrival in their home and foreign country they should not be deported at present'. On 5 August 1914, 1,100 immigrants were on Ellis Island, 600 of whom were either excluded or awaiting hearings. As ships with more newcomers continued to arrive, a huge congestion problem loomed. Although there were 1,800 beds on the Island, the New York acting Commissioner of Immigration Uhl estimated the maximum capacity for permanent stay at 1,200. The Commissioner General of Immigration Caminetti, centralised all files of excluded migrants in Washington before deciding on how to proceed. For the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie*, an emergency policy was adopted. The German vessel was at sea, bound to Hamburg, when war broke out, but made a U-turn to avoid being intercepted by the enemy, and eventually docked in Bar Harbour (Maine). The deportees on board the *Kronprinzessin Cecilie* were admitted and discharged under bond to the custody of friends and relatives, except for those with a mental illness or a 'loathsome disease'. These were transferred to Ellis Island, where they remained at the expense of the Hamburg America Line.²⁴ Possibilities were, just like the repatriation effort, openly discussed with representatives of the shipping lines. The Secretary of Labor William Wilson, who was responsible for migration policy, praised the lines for their cooperative stance. While figuring out what to do, shipping companies needed to prioritise tightening control in Europe to prevent new undesirables from arriving.²⁵

What to do in these cases was part of a broader debate about the rights of neutrals during wartime, which put Secretary of State Bryan at odds with President Wilson. Wilson adhered to traditional views regulating blockades, transport of contraband goods and civilians, while Bryan argued that technological innovations such as submarines had undermined international law. He called for a more restrictive interpretation to prevent citizens from travelling to belligerent nations, while Wilson even allowed them to do so on belligerent ships.²⁶ Bryan favoured suspending deportations altogether during the war, yet this stance quickly came under pressure. When taking charge, the New York Commissioner of Immigration Frederic Howe seconded Uhl's argument that, if migrants still arrived from South

American, West Indian and some European ports, it should be possible to deport the ineligible back with equal safety.²⁷ In addition to new arrivals, the number of people ordered to be deported for pre-existing conditions after having stayed in the US for a period of time increased. While for new arrivals, the maintenance bills were automatically passed on to shipping companies, this was less straightforward for expellees who had legally landed, especially if their removal was postponed indefinitely. Releasing deportees on bail to be deported when conditions allowed was the easiest way of deferring such costs to the deportee or their immediate network. Yet this held the risk that the undesirables would create further disturbance or go into hiding. Meanwhile, as weeks went by, immigrant detention facilities came under increasing strain. The newly appointed Commissioner Howe, who wanted to humanise the conditions at Ellis Island, started his mission under the greatest possible strain. He reported that tensions had brought the Island to the brink of mutiny and urged his superiors to relieve the congestion.²⁸

For their part, shipping companies heavily leaned towards sending deportees back or releasing them on bail to avoid exorbitant maintenance bills. Humanitarian concerns were not a priority for them. Crossing the seas in a time of war was not without risk, even on neutral ships. The rules of the sea during the early stages of the war established that no passenger liner, even belligerent ones, was deliberately targeted by military action. Nonetheless, all ships exposed themselves to accidental attacks and, most significantly, sea mines. The Holland America Liner *Potsdam* hit one in the English Channel in October, without suffering loss of life. In addition to these risks, companies dealt with rapidly increasing operational costs due to war conditions, such as longer routes, increased inspections, higher insurance costs and skyrocketing prices for most necessities. They also faced personnel shortages due to military duty. Even the HAL suffered from it, as it was not only foreign personnel from belligerent nations who were called up, but also Dutch nationals.²⁹

Nonetheless, shipping companies tried everything in their power to remain operative as the profits to be reaped were unprecedented, with freight rates going up 400%. The HAL paid unprecedented dividends, wrote off a huge part of its debts and built up major reserves during wartime. Although these were mainly derived from the transport of goods also carried on passenger ships, the HAL kept its passenger service as regular as possible to capture as much of the ongoing passenger business as possible. By providing the best service possible in times of emergency, the Dutch line hoped to foster customer loyalty with new clients who would show their appreciation with future bookings when peace returned. An important reason to keep the passenger service operational was to answer the anticipated overwhelming demand when peace was restored. As many rival companies would take much longer to reposition themselves, the HAL intended to use the opportunity to increase its market share.³⁰ The line initially managed to retain its full schedule of 48 sailings in 1914, decreasing gradually in the following years to 37 and 24 sailings in the next two years. Only when the US entered the war did its operations come to a near standstill, with seven sailings in 1917 and four the year after.³¹

To secure as much business as possible, the HAL made an agreement with its shipping cartel partner, North German Lloyd, to transport Russian passengers stuck in Bremen at the outbreak of the war. Yet, the uncertain outcome of what would happen to those being refused entry made the company regret its decision. Since 1882, US immigration reforms had gradually expanded the shipping companies' financial responsibility in the deportation process. It started with transferring the costs of bringing rejected passengers back to Europe to the shipping companies. In 1891, this practice was extended to those deported after landing. Moreover, the maintenance of any unlawful passenger while in detention on land was also added to the bill. The 1903 reform transferred half of the inland transportation cost to the port of deportation to the shipping companies too. They also had to pay for the passage of accompanying persons when required, for example for minors or certain diseased passengers. Failing to return such passengers resulted in a minimum fine of \$300. As long as such fines remained unsettled, the authorities refused to grant the ship clearance from any American port.³² However, Drew Keeling has downplayed the importance of the measures for shipping lines. The low deportation rates, balancing out at around one per cent before the war at a cost of eight dollars per person, were insignificant compared to the profits reaped on those allowed in.³⁴ True, the ocean transport did not penalise the shipping lines heavily, but Keeling does overlook the other costs, especially the maintenance bills, which were a much larger financial burden than the transportation costs alone.³³

For instance, among the passengers transferred from the NGL to the HAL, an unspecified number of Russians were withheld for the eye disease trachoma. They were treated in local hospitals at a daily rate of \$1.25. Curing the disease could easily take months, which resulted in exorbitant medical bills for shipping lines. HAL considered passing on the bill to the NGL, but the latter refused because the passengers had passed medical inspection in Rotterdam during the transfer before boarding the Dutch vessel *Potsdam*. The HAL then tried to recoup the costs from family members already in the US, but this strategy only worked in a small number of cases. Therefore, shipping lines generally tried to bring them back as quickly as possible, but they depended on the US immigration authorities to give an order to do so. However, the authorities generally refused to cooperate as they considered the maintenance bills a legitimate penalty for bringing over undesirables and used these as leverage to encourage shipping companies to tighten controls before departure from Europe. The war conditions further reduced the chances of obtaining the release of Russian passengers, as the HAL could not secure their transport back to their home country via Rotterdam. They could perhaps be routed via England to Archangel, but the Russian port closed for winter. Hence, the passengers were likely to be detained until cured or until the end of the war. Migrants detained for non-contagious diseases cost 90 cents per diem and healthy passengers held at Ellis Island 24 cents. The HAL's biggest concern was the detention costs of passengers struck by insanity due to the war situation, such as Dorothea M, a German woman. The immigration authorities could not possibly expect the line to pay three dollars a day for an indefinite period. The directors urged the New York agents to negotiate their release for deportation as quickly as possible.³⁵

Resuming deportations

The immigration authorities were not oblivious to these concerns, firstly because they faced congestion problems themselves and secondly because the decade-long interdependence between shipping lines and federal immigration inspectors to land passengers, control them and deport undesirables had led to a collaborative working relationship, even if at times disagreements had to be settled in court.³⁶ On 16 September 1914, the Department of Commerce ordered the resumption of the deportation of unlawful aliens to their countries of origin wherever possible, in French, English or neutral vessels.³⁷ In practice, this meant that new arrivals and those excluded after arrival from most allied countries, including Britain, France and Serbia, could be returned. Furthermore, citizens of neutral countries were again deportable, including Dutch, Scandinavians, Italians, Greeks, Spanish, Portuguese and Swiss. All deportees needed to sign a letter by which they accepted the risks at high seas. Shipping companies responsible for bringing these passengers to the US could outsource their removal to other lines if more convenient for the deportee.

The correspondence of the HAL does not indicate any issues with deporting such passengers. It is doubtful that the letter regarding risks at sea empowered deportees to resist their expulsion by refusing to sign. This seemed nothing more than a mere formality, as no evidence for it being an obstacle surfaced in the HAL correspondence, which treated issues regarding deportations with particular attention. And obstacles were still plentiful, because HAL's client base consisted mainly of nationalities for whom deportations were not resumed, namely migrants from the Austrian-Hungarian empire and Russia. The immigration authorities treated such cases on a more individual basis but showed great reluctance to approve deportations. By looking at two different cases, Germans and Russians, we can see the different policies that were adopted at work.

During the first days of the war, the HAL hoped to profit from transporting German and Austrian-Hungarian nationals back to Europe, as shipping lines of these belligerent nations had discontinued their service.³⁸ However, the British admiralty prevented this by declaring the North Sea a military zone. It imposed controls on Dutch ships at high seas or British ports mainly for contraband, but also to prevent enemy aliens from reaching the Netherlands. Although in violation of neutrality laws, these controls were facilitated by the passive stance of the United States. This weakened the Dutch protests, which sought to protect the country's neutrality as well as its economy, given that it relied heavily on German transit trade. To facilitate the trade, Dutch businessmen negotiated a compromise by founding the Netherlands Overseas Trust, which functioned as clearing house for overseas imports under British control without overly upsetting its relations with Germany. The latter launched submarine campaigns targeting enemy merchant ships as a retaliation for the Allied naval blockade. This further increased the value of neutral Dutch ships that managed to navigate through these troubled waters.³⁹

British controls were part of economic warfare. Their main aim was to reduce the passage of contraband goods to the enemy. The fact that the volume of ships clearing Dutch ports

dropped by 75% is a testimony to the impact of the blockade.⁴⁰ How this affected human mobility has received less attention. The correspondence of the HAL shows that the British admiralty screened passengers for enemy aliens and detained any such passengers as prisoners of war. The point of these controls was to deter German overseas reservists from returning home and joining the war effort. The HAL did not prevent nationals of the Central Powers from booking return tickets to Europe at first but added clauses protecting itself from liability and refund claims if passengers became prisoners of war. However, the British authorities extended the detention of the HAL's ships to discourage the practice. As a result, HAL stopped boarding German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Ottoman male passengers of reservist age and by mid-September 1914 tightened measures to prevent them from boarding as stowaways or with false papers. At times, the British consul was even invited to witness passengers embarking in New York to allay suspicions.⁴¹ However, the new paper barriers also opened up opportunities for illegal migration. Some of these nationals used Dutch identity documents to make the crossing. Others got hired as staff with Finnish or Swedish papers. Some were detected and discharged as prisoners of war in British ports, but others made it to Rotterdam. To avoid Dutch passengers and crew being subjected to greater scrutiny by the British, the HAL increased its screenings before embarkation. To facilitate this, it convinced the envoy to include photographs on Dutch passports. Despite sharpening pre-embarkation identity controls it was still difficult to prove that the traveller presenting the papers was not the rightful owner and to refuse permission to travel on these grounds. To reduce opportunities for stowaways, the practice of opening passenger ships for public visits the day before departure was cancelled. Despite HAL's efforts, some Germans and Austro-Hungarians were still able to travel on false documents or as stowaways. Furthermore, regular passengers who were made prisoners of war caused trouble by claiming compensation due to their detention the Isle of Man. The HAL rejected such claims since arrests in Queenstown occurred under *force majeure*. The only reimbursement claim the company considered was that of the American Jack Stiel. He had travelled without papers in second cabin to sell a patent in Rotterdam but was arrested in Falmouth on 23 August. The German-born, naturalised US citizen was transferred to the Isle of Man and only made it back home in December when he was able to obtain American identity papers.⁴²

British controls impeded the deportation of nationals of Central Powers, as exemplified by German citizen Jacob Rice. After completing a jail sentence in Seattle, his pending deportation order could not be carried out. The Commissioner General of Immigration, Caminetti, considered extending his detention in jail, but did not want to set a precedent by billing the costs to the Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, the legal grounds to prolong his incarceration were hazy and could easily be overruled by a writ of habeas corpus. Caminetti moved to release this person and others in a similar situation not on bond but on personal recognisance. Rice was thus required to report his whereabouts every 30 days until deportation was possible. This offered a temporary solution until his three-year legal limit for deportation after arrival expired. If deportation remained impossible, Caminetti hoped that, by then, the immigration laws would have been amended to extend the period

for deportation.⁴³ Limiting the costs of detention on the public budget played a crucial role in this decision. In sum, the case also showed a specific way of reducing maintenance bills: discharging deportees on bond to friends and relatives or on recognisance pending a re-evaluation of their position in due course. The HAL supported both methods as these relieved shipping companies of any responsibility for maintenance bills.

However, the question what to do with sick persons from the Central Powers was an altogether different issue. Take Dorothea M. for example, who suffered from insanity. The HAL petitioned her deportation several times and finally received the go-ahead from the immigration authorities, but Howe overturned this decision at the last minute, forcing her to be disembarked from the ship on humanitarian grounds. Still, Dorothea's case shows that Germans who posed no risk of being arrested as prisoners of war on their way to Rotterdam still faced deportation. Unfortunately, our source does not tell us what happened to her after Howe's decision, nor who bore the costs for her further detention.⁴⁴ She disappeared from HAL's correspondence, indicating that the authorities stopped sending the bill for such cases to the shipping companies. Some deportees remained at Ellis Island for a long time, and Howe did significantly improve their accommodations, for instance by providing facilities for entertainment and by relaxing the strict separation of the sexes. Still, Ellis Island remained first and foremost a place of transit. Humanitarian considerations continued to play a minimal role only, as is illustrated by the fate of HAL's largest group and its main concern: 20 Russians awaiting deportation.⁴⁵ Most were detained for trachoma. As long as families of detainees or charitable organisations covered the costs, which was the case for four of them, HAL favoured their treatment in the US. For the 16 others, their chances of a quick recovery needed to be established. If these seemed promising, HAL covered the cost. If not, and for all other ailments for which no change was to be expected, such as feeble-mindedness or chronic diseases, and if the American authorities refused to release the detainee on bond until deportation, the New York office received orders to press for official permission to transport them to Rotterdam. The HAL guaranteed no passengers would be transferred home until safe transport could be ensured. In the meantime, they would be cared for at the Dutch port where HAL could arrange much cheaper care.⁴⁶ By November, the authorities had refused HAL's expert oculist permission to assess the seriousness of their eye disease. Nevertheless, Dr. Williams of Ellis Island informed them that none would be healed for at least another three months. For HAL, if the immigration authorities wanted to uphold the humanitarian principle of keeping those who could not be transported at Ellis Island, it should defray the expenses. The Dutch line on the other hand was willing to take full responsibility for carrying them back to Rotterdam and ordered their attorneys Lord, Day & Lord to start legal proceedings to force a breakthrough.⁴⁷ Before the war, the legal cost of such test cases was shared between the partners of the shipping cartel. The war, however, seriously disrupted the collaboration between the shipping lines, and the archives do not reveal whether any other companies supported HAL.

The lawyers acting for HAL discovered that the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) had lobbied to stay deportations and advised families to stop payments for maintenance, leaving

the shipping companies to foot the bill. Established in 1881, HIAS had built up a long history of assisting Jewish migrants, including mediating rights of landing and challenging deportations. This increased the immigrants' chances of staying permanently in the US, but gave no guarantees. The case of the Westernik family, originally from Russia, exemplifies the strain that trachoma put on affected migrants and how little humanitarian considerations mattered in the administrative decisions to expel. Adam Westernik had lived in the US for six years and had set out with his family on a visit to the home country in July 1914. The trip quickly turned into a nightmare as they never reached their destination due to the war and got stuck in Rotterdam before finally returning to the US. Having contracted trachoma on the trip, Adam impeded the re-entry of his family. He was detained for trachoma after arriving with the *Ryndam* in early October 1914 with his wife Bronislawa and their baby Maria. He was transferred for treatment to the Ellis Island hospital and ordered to be deported. His wife and child were landed on bond to be deported at the first available opportunity, on the grounds that they were likely to become a public charge. Bronislawa's brothers and sisters, who lived in New Jersey, appealed the decision with no result, except for the child. Evidence showed that she was born in the US and therefore could remain there. As with the majority of migrants, Adam had not started proceedings to acquire US citizenship during his previous stay. Because he had failed to do so, he and his family did not enjoy protection against refusal of entry and were processed like any other newly arrived Russians. At the re-hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry judged the brothers to be unable to provide for them, reaffirming Adam and Bronislawa's exclusion.⁴⁸

The archive does not reveal what happened to the Westerniks afterwards. However, it indicates that they probably were part of the first group of about 20 Russians who were deported to Rotterdam on the *New Amsterdam* in December 1914. The HAL's attorneys successfully defended the case that shipping lines could not be forced to pay for maintenance bills if they could return immigrants to the port from which they came or their country of origin. The Fabre Line had already successfully adopted this argument. Key figures of the immigration administration, such as Uhl, Howe and Caminetti, also were in favour of deporting them as quickly as possible. State Secretary Bryan gave in by expelling them to the port of embarkation until conditions allowed a return to their country of origin. To facilitate future deportations, Howe demanded reports on the care received by these Russians in Rotterdam. Two weeks later, three more cases were scheduled. Charity organisations were first given the opportunity to cover the costs for their care in the US. Howe and Uhl backed this policy on the condition that these organisations could prove they had the means to do so. At this time, HAL was still dealing with the cases of 11 detainees held for health reasons at Ellis Island, including nine trachoma cases. For the latter, charity organisations and families agreed to pay for the treatment again to prevent deportations.⁴⁹

At the same time, the deportation of the insane resumed. The medical examiner of the Deportation Bureau, Michael Osnato, reported to the New York State Hospital Commission that federal immigration authorities had only deported one case in August 1914, compared to monthly averages of 35 before the war. By December, the numbers had become 'almost

normal again'. Nevertheless, the State of New York was increasingly burdened with the care of insane immigrants because the budget of the federal Deportation Bureau was unusually small. People residing in the US for over three years and who were therefore not deportable under the provisions of the immigration law also posed problems. Still, of the latter category, 426 'were returned to their native countries either at the expense of the State of New York or of their friends'. The decrease compared to 1913, when 486 persons were deported, is mainly the result of a two-month interruption at the outbreak of the war 'that brought to a near standstill the work of the bureau that deals with this matter'. Osnato emphasised the help received from charitable organisations, not least the Council of Jewish Women, and of the New York Police.⁵⁰ This shows not only that deportations of the insane resumed, but also that this happened to people outside of the formal legal norms in what could be categorised as 'voluntary' departures. Compared to 4,610 formal post-entry deportations in 1914 for the entire country, the 426 'voluntary' departures of insane aliens who had overstayed the three-year legal limit for the state of New York alone is a high number indeed.⁵¹ As the seat of the main port of arrival for immigrants, the state of New York clearly carried the brunt of the problem, but this also shows that the federal authorities did not monopolise migration enforcement and that seaboard state authorities and local police forces continued what they had started long before federal authorities stepped in.⁵² This confirms Adam Goodman's observation that financial and legal restrictions limiting the immigration authorities' formal deportation measures led to the development of 'voluntary' departures as an alternative means of expulsion. The evidence indicates that such 'voluntary' departures have older and stronger roots by sea in seaboard states, and that they were used before the systematic deportation of Canadians and Mexicans via land routes.⁵³ Unfortunately, the records of the HAL do not mention anything about these practices, indicating that they were not directly involved and clearly did not pay for their passage.

Regarding formal deportations, the records show that HAL did not always transport its deportees itself, as illustrated by the case of Stelios Tulekiles. Like the Westerniks, this Greek migrant also landed in October 1914 with trachoma from the *Ryndam* and was ordered to be deported. The HAL negotiated his transport with the Greek Line. Even if the Dutch Line had to pay the charitable rate of \$25 for his passage, it was much cheaper than the hospital expenses, which in this case could not be transferred to family or charitable institutions.⁵⁴ By 1915, the practice of outsourcing transport to other lines was extended to Russians as well. By May, the direct route to Archangel serviced by the Russian-American Line was reopened. However, HIAS protested against this route, in particular for deportees heading for the Jewish Pale, since the 1000-mile journey from the port would lead to great hardship. When the *Kursk* was set to sail with 26 deportees who had been transferred from various mental hospitals, HIAS submitted a letter which moved the State Hospital Commission to reverse the order. The lobbying efforts of charitable organisations paid off and closed the Archangel route for deportees. Instead, an itinerary used for Finns via Scandinavian ports was extended via railroad connections to the Russian hinterland for Russian Jews. The HAL also retained its right to ship Russians back to Rotterdam.⁵⁵ However, it came close to losing it, because of a Russian

woman called Mariana Zablocka. She arrived in America with trachoma in August 1914 and was deported in December to Rotterdam until conditions allowed her to return to Russia. Instead, in June 1915, Mariana returned to New York with the *Noordam*. The Rotterdam office stated that returning her home had proven too difficult for lack of relatives in Russia and her lack of identity papers, as a result of which the Russian authorities had refused to provide any support. After spending months in a local hospital, the company doctor had declared her cured of trachoma. Her mental well-being suffered from being stuck in the Netherlands. The HAL contacted her family in the US to pay for her crossing again. The family wanted a guarantee of landing from HAL, but it was in no position to give this. They emphasised that immigration laws did not prevent deportees from re-entry, and that her cure lifted the legal impediment to her entry. The family eventually paid for Mariana's second crossing, but she was refused entry by American doctors for trachoma again. Immigration authorities considered the arrival as a broken promise to care for such passengers until it was safe to return them home. The HAL was reprimanded especially for not contacting the immigration authorities first before deciding to reembark her, which probably would have met their approval anyway. Eventually, they allowed HAL to transfer her to Rotterdam on 3 August 1915. With hospital rates for trachoma having increased to \$3.25, her medical bill was around \$130. This was a penalty which HAL was unlikely to pass on to the family, and which was negligible compared to the costs of no longer being able to return such cases to Rotterdam at all. However, it served as a warning against sending such cases back to the US.⁵⁶

This example shows the modus operandi of formal deportations throughout the war until 1917 when the US entered the conflict and carried out a major immigration reform. Even the torpedoing of the Cunard Line's *Lusitania* which had left New York in May 1915 with 1,250 passengers on board, 790 of whom perished alongside 404 crew members, did not change much. The vessel carried nine deportees, some of whom were listed among the casualties. Since then, the US authorities wanted to restrict deportations to neutral vessels. However, Italian companies, which had just lost their neutral status a month before, successfully contested this idea by refusing to pay any maintenance cost for excluded passengers after the departure of their first available sailing. The annual report of the Commissioner General of Immigration gives us some more statistical details on the different strategies used during those years. Figures for the fiscal years of 1915 and 1916 (from July 1914 to June 1916) show that 24,111 and 18,867 aliens faced deportation orders, but only carried out in 4,962 and 5,256 cases, respectively. Seventy-five per cent were excluded at the gates and 25% after arrival. Medical reasons, often connected with the likelihood of becoming a public charge, were the dominant justifications, used in over 75% of cases. The rest consisted of all other excluded classes, mainly prostitutes and pimps, criminals, polygamists and anarchists.⁵⁷

The numbers show that, while awaiting peace, most of the migrants debarred on arrival were released on bond to family and charitable organisations until they could be removed. This was the cheapest solution, offering guarantees that the person did not become a public charge and that he or she remained traceable. The practice started when most people believed that the war would be over soon. As it dragged on, the question whether they fell

under the three-year legal limit of deportation after arrival was a legal grey area. This time limit definitely applied to those who were to be deported after legally entering the territory. More micro-research is needed to assess whether such cases were given priority and what happened to those who could not be deported back within this time frame. Such research needs to uncover whether the 'voluntary' departures organised for the insane also applied to other categories. The case of Jacob Rice shows that, aside from bonds, releasing on personal recognisance was also in use. Male nationals of reservist age from the Central Powers were the only category for whom deportations came to a full standstill.

The war does not seem to have posed any obstacles to the return of other nationals to the European continent. Humanitarian concerns did play a part, which is illustrated by the complete suspension of deportations during the first six weeks of the conflict and by the decision to facilitate the release on bond and personal recognisance of the majority of the deportees for the duration of the war. Yet, the latter decision was also steered by logistical concerns to relieve the congestion at immigrant detention centres, and just as much by financial considerations. It offered a quick fix in uncertain times, without weighing on state funds. This option only applied to people with enough means, mainly via family ties, and for certain groups via charitable organisations. These high numbers highlight the agency of the migrant and their social networks, and of charitable organisations. Still, a considerable minority was held back, alongside people with contagious diseases and the insane. Their fate depended mainly on who was willing to pay their maintenance bills.

Until the war, the financial responsibility for the maintenance and deportation of undesirables fell mainly on the shipping companies. They were legally obliged to deport them to their home country at the first possible occasion. However, the shipping lines of the Central Powers, including two of the biggest players on the market, were suddenly no longer able to fulfil this obligation. Such ships initiated the process of releasing deportees on bond, but further research is needed to establish what happened to those who could not be landed in this way. The immigration authorities probably tried to transfer the costs of their maintenance to the German shipping giants as quickly as possible. Yet the discontinued service of these companies created immediate cash-flow problems, and they probably challenged their obligation to pay on the grounds of *force majeure*. The solution of postponing the deportation and transferring the maintenance bills to shipping lines that remained operative also came under increasing pressure. Shipping companies had a long history of taking cases to court if no compromise with the immigration authorities was reached. In this case, the obligation under the immigration law for shipping companies to return undesirables left little room for interpretation. This principle was not something the immigration authorities wanted to see questioned in court, as they were not ready yet to take on the financial responsibility for deportees. Eventually, they facilitated the deportation of people with little means and no social network and those with diseases who incurred high maintenance bills, even if they were not able to ship them all the way home. Financial considerations, especially transferring the monetary and logistical responsibility of deportation to shipping companies, determined

removal strategies. The 1917 immigration reform marks a shift in terms of the state authorities starting to take matters into their own hands.

Reforming laws to new deportation realities?

The Bureau of Immigration's main source of revenue came from the head tax collected on all alien passengers landing in the US. The revenue was transferred into the 'Immigration Fund'. This was doubled from \$1 to \$2 in 1903 and again to \$4 in 1907. With the boom in migrants and travellers that preceded the war, revenues surged. This allowed the Bureau to rapidly expand its human resources and still be a source of revenue for the state. In 1911, after deducting all enforcement costs, the 913,880 taxable entrants produced a surplus of one million dollars, which was transferred to the Immigration Fund.⁵⁸ This healthy financial situation was reversed as new arrivals plummeted during the war. Already in October 1914, all migrant control stations were urged to reduce their costs. This period of austerity meant that there was even less room to consider covering heavy maintenance bills for deportees, despite major reserves. By 1916, the Immigration Fund still had nine million dollars in reserves, but the red figures for that year, with \$761,000 in revenue and \$2,305,000 in expenses, took a large chunk out of their funds.⁵⁹ Furthermore, the red figures would have been even more daunting, were it not for migrants and their networks, charitable organisations, and especially shipping companies that covered an important share of the costs of enforcement. Congress also stepped in by increasing its appropriation to enforce immigration laws.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, the 1917 immigration reform, which came into effect in May, again doubled the tax to \$8.⁶¹ This increase ensured that the Immigration Fund's reserves would decrease more slowly during the war, but also, and especially, that they would be replenished quickly when transatlantic travel returned to normality. More financial means meant more possibilities to become independent from third parties, not least the shipping companies. Still the inherent contradiction between, on the one hand, the Bureau of Immigration's dependence on funding based on the number of allowed passengers, and on the other hand, its core task being to reject undesirables, remained.

Another innovation regarding deportation was that people removed under the provisions of the new law could not reapply for admission within the first year of their removal. Returnee cases such as that of Mariana Zablocka were now officially prevented by law within the first year of their deportation. People deported for links to prostitution were even barred for life, and any attempt to re-enter was considered a misdemeanour punishable with a prison sentence of up to two years.⁶² The passenger manifests were yet again expanded with new questions. They now contained 33 sections, but there was still no question about whether the applicant had been removed previously from the country. Inspectors might have worked with alphabetical indexes of deportees as a more reliable source. Nevertheless, the manifest remained the corner stone of immigrant inspection. It was provided by shipping companies that processed vast amounts of information according to detailed stipulations of the law in order to facilitate controls.⁶³ Any serious omission was subject to a fine of \$10, and the fine for bringing passengers with contagious diseases that should have been detected before

leaving was doubled to \$200. Additionally, lines now had to refund such deportees for their complete trip to the point of departure via the collector of customs. Such carrier sanctions highlight the fact that the reform continued to increase the responsibility of shipping lines to prevent undesirable people from leaving Europe. Refunding the passage and a possible \$200 fine also applied to illiterates who were added to the list of excluded classes. The same principle was also now extended to include all mental and physical defects that made aliens unable to make a living and that should have been detected before boarding, albeit with a lower potential fine of \$25.⁶⁴

The provisions regarding 'detention', which was now renamed 'safekeeping', remained unaltered and ambiguous. Shipping companies retained the responsibility until they had transferred passengers to immigrant inspection. The immigration authorities were responsible as long as passengers were detained at the station. Yet, for anyone temporarily removed for extra care before landing or being deported, shipping lines still had to cover the costs of transfer, maintenance, medical treatment and, if necessary, burial.⁶⁵ The provisions regarding deportation stated that where aliens were found to have committed violations of the law, the costs of maintenance while awaiting deportation and of transport fell on the shipping company.⁶⁶ During the 1890s, the immigration authorities had stretched the interpretation of these provisions, passing on much of the maintenance bills at detention centres to shipping lines. When during the 1900s shipping lines started to collaborate more in order to challenge dubious interpretations of the law, court decisions sided with business interests.⁶⁷ An important win came in November 1914, when the US Supreme Court decided in favour of HAL regarding the medical costs of temporarily detained passengers who were eventually allowed to land. The court ruled that such costs had to be covered by the Immigration Fund and established that maintenance bills and other expenses could only be billed to shipping lines for passengers who were ordered to be removed.⁶⁸

The reform's most significant changes regarding removals were to the deportation of aliens after landing. Deportation was no longer limited to the excluded classes, aliens with pre-existing conditions and aliens who had entered illegally. As of then, aliens imprisoned for at least one year for crimes involving moral turpitude committed in the US were now deportable as well. Furthermore, the period of deportation was extended to five years after arrival and in some cases, such as recidivist criminals, indefinitely. In addition to deporting people to their home country, the law now also mentioned their port of embarkation to the US as an alternative. This legalised the ongoing practice of deporting Russians to Rotterdam. For those deported within five years for pre-existing conditions, half of their removal costs to the US port of embarkation had to be billed to the '*contractor or procurer*' responsible for the arrival of the unlawful alien. The immigration authorities had been using this clause to transfer as much responsibility as possible to the shipping lines. Costs for overseas transport were borne by the shipping line that brought the passenger in and, if not applicable, by state appropriation. The costs of deportations initiated after the five-year limit, and of deportations following crimes committed in the US, now had to be fully covered by state appropriations and could not be transferred to shipping companies.⁶⁹ The few sailings of the *Noordam* and

the *Ryndam* that still occurred after the passage of the law show a clear intention of enforcing the law to the letter. Unfortunately, the major disruptions of traffic until the end of the war make it impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis of the impact of the law.⁷⁰

Up until now, scholars have focused mainly on the adoption of the literacy test within the 1917 immigration reform. Pushed by anti-immigration lobbyists as the most favoured measure for decades and approved by the House of Representatives or Senate 17 times before finally being made law, the test was an important milestone for restriction. While initially mainly symbolic, it paved the way for the Quota Acts in 1921 and 1924. Limiting entries based on a fixed quota per national origin, these acts had a much more severe impact on European immigration than the literacy test.⁷¹ Scholars focusing on deportation highlight people being removed for having committed crimes following arrival in the US as key element of 1917 reform. This marked the breakthrough of post-entry social control as a powerful tool in the hands of the immigration authorities, who subsequently developed it into the central pillar of modern deportation law.⁷² What has remained under the radar is that the reform also established new financial strategies to administer and pay for migration policies.

Conclusion

The practice of transferring responsibilities to shipping companies to enforce migration law goes back to the beginning of the nineteenth century.⁷³ By 1917, shipping lines held a central position, which was reinforced by the legal reform of certain aspects. For instance, the new law increased the fines for bringing in undesirables, instated obligatory refunding of certain illiterate and diseased deportees for their trip to the US, and extended the period to deport aliens for pre-existing conditions from three to five years. At the same time, the reform also made it clear that the limits of depending on third parties such as shipping lines had been reached. For the first time, the law placed the entire responsibility for deporting certain unlawful aliens on the state authorities. For a long time, this had been inconceivable, mainly because of how much such a precedent could weigh on state resources. Similar budgetary constraints had also determined the authorities' use of deportation to exclude Chinese immigrants.⁷⁴ Yet, this apprehension was finally let go of and structurally incorporated into the 1917 immigration reform. Soon after, the immigration authorities started rounding up enemy aliens and radicals. When conditions allowed it by 1919, the authorities used administrative measures to ship back groups on their own initiative and at their own cost. In the case of the *Buford*, better known as the Soviet Ark, this even meant using the authorities' own ship. The bill for this alone amounted to \$76,000, not including the human resources of eight accompanying immigrant agents and 64 soldiers. It also excludes the costs of surveillance, arrest, detention, interior transport and the massive effort of the Bureau of Immigration to coordinate the enterprise. The fact that no other groups followed illustrates that the US authorities were not fully prepared yet to organise deportation at all costs in the very literal meaning of the term.⁷⁵ This is confirmed by deportations to Mexico where financial considerations limited the journey to the border rather than to the immigrants' hometown, even if this facilitated re-entries.⁷⁶ On the other hand, by creating the

Deportation and Transportation Division in 1919, the immigration authorities formalised and systemised the process of removal to minimise expenses, as it became increasingly difficult to defer to third parties.⁷⁷ In the meantime the US railroads had been wholly integrated into the deportation infrastructure, thereby completely rationalising and facilitating removals from the interior.⁷⁸

To fully appreciate how this proved to be a turning point in the state taking over financial responsibility over deportation from the shipping companies, the analysis needs to be extended to the 1920s and beyond. Historians need to look more closely at the financial aspects of enforcing migration policies as a more structural steering element that explains shifts over time. Another conclusion is that the First World War deserves more attention as a catalyst for long-term changes. The war showed that deportations could be quickly and completely suspended if need be. This even turned into a long-term solution for a majority of deportees who were released on bond. To complete our understanding of the extent to which the immigration authorities had expanded their authority to the interior, we need to know what happened eventually to those released on bond. This could shed light on whether this group had an influence on the debates around the extension to five years and of post-entry deportation measures and their enforcement in practice. Or did 'voluntary' departure also become a solution for these cases? Did phasing out the role of transport companies in formal deportations bolster 'voluntary' deportations at state expense? The sources used in this article favoured those who were not released on bond but detained and formally deported. They show that in all cases, financial considerations played a determining role. As authorities and shipping lines proved unwilling to cover the heavy maintenance bills of people who were unable to land, they stretched the legal, logistical and humanitarian concerns to deport them at all costs. The pre-war logic clearly prevailed in these cases, and in many future cases to come. Deportations to Europe were not paused during the war, but conversely developed into a major policy issue which helped to consolidate the old regime and inaugurate a new one at the same time.

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Notes

1. New York Times (NYT), 2 August 1914, *Deport eight Lunatics*; and August 6, 1914, *Deportable aliens cost city \$1,000,000*.
2. Shanks, *Immigration*, 39.
3. Hester, *Deportation*, 2, 35–52.
4. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations*; Pope-Obeda, "National Expulsions," 19–22; and Pope-Obeda, "Expelling," 40–42.
5. Hutchinson, *Legislative History*, 47–158; and Kanstroom, *Deportation Nation*, 125–34;
6. Kanstroom, *Deportation Nation*, 4–7; Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*; and Hester, *Deportation*, Moloney, *National Insecurities* and Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*.
7. Hoerder *Migration in the Atlantic*, 43.
8. Daly, "Friends and Foes," 152–153.
9. McKeown, *Melancholy Order*. For how also in Europe the First World War has been too narrowly considered as a breaking point and that ante and post-war migration policies should instead be viewed as a continuum, see: Reinecke, *Grenzen*.
10. Cannato, *American Passage*, 291–308
11. US Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1916, vii – viii; and Feys, "The Business," 266–274.
12. Cannato, *American Passage*, 300–305.
13. Moloney, *National Insecurities*.
14. Walters, "Aviation as Deportation," 2796–2817; and Walters, "On the Road," 94–110.
15. Blue, *The Deportation Express*, 16.
16. Nonetheless, Walters has shown that governments have again increasingly reintegrated transport companies in migration governance during the past decades. Feys, "The Maritime Origins," in press.
17. Schneider, *Crossing Borders*, 11; and Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations*, 50; and Zolberg, "The Archeology,"
18. Miller, *Europe*, 215.

19. Sebak and Feys, "America's first," 228–237.
20. Gough, "What I did," 269; Sebak and Feys, "America's first," 228–237.
21. Sebak and Feys, "America's first," 231, 239–44; Sebak, "A Transatlantic."
22. Feys, *The Battle*; Feys, "The Business,"; and Keeling, *A Business*; Sebak, "A Transatlantic", 159–160.
23. Sebak and Feys, "America's first," 232, 243–45; Feys, "The Business," 257–266.
24. State Secretary as quoted by Secretary of Labour. National Archives Washington (NAW), Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (RINS), RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters W. Wilson 7 and 22 August; letters B.Uhl 5 and August 12, 1914; and Cannato, *American Passage*, 300.
25. Community Archives Rotterdam (CAR), Holland America Lijn Archief (HAL), 318.03, 225, letters 18 September and 6 October; NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters B. Uhl 5 and August 1914; and letter Secretary of Labour 12 and August 20, 1914.
26. Following the sinking of the *Lusitania*, a British passenger vessel upon which 128 American civilians died, Bryan resigned. See Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State.
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/bryan-william-jennings?_gl=1*2or6rg*_gcl_au*MTg2OTQzNTI0LjE3MDI4ODk1Mjc.
27. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letter Secretary of Labor 7 and August 22; Letter of Uhl August 30.
28. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters August 28 and October 9; and Cannato, *American Passage*, 298–301.
29. Sebak and Feys, "America's first," 236; CAR, HAL, 318.02, 120, Letter August 10 1914; and 318.03, 225, Letter August 15 1914 mentioning that J. Vermeer and J. Spetter left the New York office to fulfil their military duties in Europe.
30. Frey, "Trade," 541–559; and Van Tuyll, *The Netherlands* 38; Feys, "The Business," 264, 273.
31. Before the war dividends, if paid at all, did not exceed 10%, except for the 15% in 1913. Yet this was little compared to the war time records: 17% in 1914, 50% in 1915, 55% in 1916, 25% in 1917 and 40% in 1918; and see CAR, HAL, 318.07, 27–28, HAL Annual reports 1914–1918.
32. US Congress, An act to regulate Immigration, 29th Cong., 1st sess., August 3 1882, 214–15, sec.1-5, here 4–5; US Congress, An act in Amendment to the various Acts relative to Immigration, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., March 3 1891, 1084–86, sec. 1–13, here 10–11; US Congress, An Act to regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the US, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., March 3, 1903, 1213–22, sec. 1–39, here 11, 19–21.
33. Feys, "The Maritime Origins," in press; Feys, *The Battle*.
34. Keeling, *A Business*, 170–71.
35. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 225, Letters September 18 and October 6.
36. Feys, "The Maritime Origins," in press.
37. NYT, September 17, "Deportation of Aliens to be Resumed."
38. CAR, HAL, 318.02, 120, letters August 10 and 18, 1914.

39. Frey, "Trade," 542–49; Kruizinga, "NOT neutrality," 85–98; and van Tuyll, *The Netherlands*, 134–143.
40. Kruizinga, "NOT neutrality," 85–103.
41. CAR, HAL, 318.02, 120, Letters 10 and 18 August; December 24, 1914, 318.03, 225, Letter September 14, 1914; and 230 Letters 13 and November 23, 1914.
42. CAR, HAL, 318.02, 120, Letters January, 17 May 1915; 318.03, 225, letters 22 October 1914;; 232, letters December 1, 1914 12 and January 18, 1915; 234, 3 February, 3 March, May 6, 1915; and 257, June 16, 1915.
43. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters Caminetti 5 and 24 September 1914. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 225, 230, letters September 18 and November 14, 1914.
44. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 225, letters October 6 13, 29, November 14, 1914; and 230, letters November 2, 11 1914.
45. Cannato, *American Passage*, 298–300
46. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 225, letters October 20 and November 11, 1914.
47. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 230, letters November 2, 14, December 3, 15; and NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters 28 August, 9, 10 and 11 October and 13 November.
48. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53853.39 E-F, letter Howe December 7, 1914.
49. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 230, letters November 2, 14, December 3, 15; and NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-D, letters December 2, 3 7 and hearings of board of special inquiry October 14, 17.
50. NYT, January 7 1915, "Deporting Alien Insane."
51. Pope-Obeda, "Expelling," 37.
52. Hirota H., *Expelling the Poor*.
53. Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*, 30–31.
54. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 230, letter November 11, 1914.
55. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-I, letters 15 March, 25 and 26 April, 1, 7, 19, 20 May, 16 June, October 18 and 23, 1915; January 26, 1916; NYT, 15 July 1915, "Hebrew Society Wins Case." For more examples on HIAS' influence see: Pope-Obeda, "National Expulsions," 28, 38; and Moloney, *National Insecurities*; 14–21, 83–87.
56. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 257, letters 26 June 26, July 23, August 1, 1915.
57. NAW, RINS, RG 85, 53854.39 A-I, letters 25 May, 2, 6, 9, 16, 17 June, October 8, 1915; and Anthony Caminetti, *Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1916* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916) x.
58. Daniel O'Keefe, *Annual report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1911* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912), 11.
59. NAW, RG 85, 53854.39 A-I, letters October 9, 1914, March 15; and US Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration, 1916, xxiv, 7.
60. Appropriations went from \$200,000 in 1909 to \$2.6 million in 1921. Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*, 231.
61. US Congress, An Act to regulate Immigration of Aliens, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 1917. 874–898, sec. 1–38, here 2.
62. *Ibid*, here 3–4.

63. *Ibid.*, here 12.
64. *Ibid.*, here 9.
65. *Ibid.*, here 15.
66. *Ibid.*, here 18.
67. Feys, *The Battle* 264–273, 302–309.
68. CAR, HAL, 318.02, 120, letter November 11, 1914.
69. US Congress, *An Act to regulate Immigration of Aliens*, 64th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3 1917, 874–898, sec. 1–38, here 19–20; Kanstroom, *Deportation Nation*, 133–134; and Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*, 27.
70. CAR, HAL, 318.03, 281, June 6 and 22, July 17 and 27 , 1, 2, August 15, September 19.
71. Cannato, *American Passage*, 307–308; Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door*, 35–46
72. Kanstroom, *Deportation Nation*, 131–133.
73. Feys, "The Maritime Origins," in press.
74. Daniels, *Guarding*, 21–22; Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*, 23–24; and Kanstroom, *Deportation Nation*, 118–122.
75. Zimmer, "The Voyage," 149, 155.
76. Pope-Obeda, "National Expulsions," 32.
77. Goodman, *The Deportation Machine*, 77–106; Pope-Obeda, "Expelling," 36–37.
78. Blue, *The Deportation Express*.